

HOWARD A PEYTON  
89 PESHAWAR 252

01/02/90 134320 PRINTER: WS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
PAGE 01  
ACTION REF-11

PESHAW

00252

020327Z

INFO LOG-00	ADS-00	INT-07	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00
1-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	EA-09	I-03	IRSI-00
PM-10	EAP-00	PA-01	OMC-01	INTE-00	USIE-00	SP-02
SNF-01	FATM-01	C-01	FRS-01	P-02	T-01	/071

-----227050 020336Z /64 20

P 212900Z FEB 89  
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 680H  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMCONSUL KARACHI  
AMCONSUL LAHORE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/ODC/AR

REVIEWED BY

DATE

( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
( ) EXTEND ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
( ) REPLY ( ) Non-responsive info.

FBI, EO 12958 exemptions

TS authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY as \_\_\_\_\_, OADR

( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR

CONFIDENTIAL PESHAW 00252 020327Z  
CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

E.O. 12356: DEUL:OADR

LAGS: PREL, PCOV, AF, PA

SUBJECT: TWO MUJAHIDIN DISCUSS CONSULTATIVE SHURA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. A CONVERSATION WITH TWO MUJAHIDIN CONTACTS  
SUGGESTS THAT THE ALLIANCE PARTIES MAY HAVE BEEN NEGLECTING TO  
KEEP THEIR MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY INSIDE AFGHANISTAN, INFORMED ABOUT  
THE PURPOSE AND MAKEUP OF THE CONSULTATIVE SHURA, SCHEDULED TO BE  
CONVENED ON FEBRUARY 12. THE TWO MUJAHIDIN

NOTHING BEYOND DISTORTED RUMORS ABOUT WHO WOULD TAKE PART IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PESHAW 00252 020327Z  
SECRET, AND WHAT IT WOULD DO.

Bkas-

Bkas

Bkas

IN PAKISTAN FOR A LITTLE OVER ONE YEAR. BOTH HAD BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FIND OUT WHAT THE PARTY LEADERS IN PESHAWAR WERE DOING TO PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN'S POST-WAR SITUATION. HE HAD HEARD ABOUT THE CONVENING OF A CONSULTATIVE SHURA, BUT HAD NO IDEA WHO IT WOULD CONTAIN OR WHAT IT WOULD DO. [ ]

Bla 5/9  
Bla 5/9

[ ] THE PARTIES HAD TOLD THEM NEXT TO NOTHING ABOUT THE PLANS FOR A CONSULTATIVE SHURA. HE SAID THAT IF THE PEOPLE WERE NOT CONSULTED, THEY WOULD NOT FEEL BOUND BY WHAT THE SHURA DECIDED. IF IT CHOSE AN INTERIM LEADERSHIP THE PEOPLE COULD RESPECT. THE MUJAHIDIN WOULD ACCEPT IT. IF IT DID OTHERWISE, THE PEOPLE WOULD RESIST IT.

7. POLICE SAID THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, A CONSULTATIVE SHURA WAS ONLY BEING PLANNED BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH SOME FREE AFGHAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS QUICKLY THAT COULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF ARRANGING THE TRANSITION TO A POPULAR GOVERNMENT. THE SHURA WOULD SELECT AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION THAT WOULD BE GIVEN THE JOB OF ORGANIZING ELECTIONS WITHIN ONE YEAR. THERE WAS REALLY NO WAY TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WINTER DURING A WAR. HE NOTED THAT IT HAD TAKEN [ ] OVER A MONTH TO TRAVEL

[ ] UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS, ORGANIZING AND CONDUCTING ELECTIONS WOULD TAKE MANY MONTHS. THE AFGHANS SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD TO TAKE THAT MUCH TIME.

8. [ ] HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS EXPLANATION. HE WAS, HOWEVER, STILL WORRIED BY THE WHOLE IDEA. THE CONSULTATIVE SHURA WOULD HAVE NO POPULAR MANDATE, AND THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE INTERIM LEADERSHIP WOULD BE MADE UP OF GOOD PEOPLE. "A BAD LEADER CAN DO A LOT OF HARM IN ONE YEAR," HE NOTED, ADDING: "THIS SHURA IS LIKE A COVERED POT. WE ARE BEING ASKED TO ACCEPT IT, NOT KNOWING WHAT IS INSIDE."

MALINOWSKI  
CONFIDENTIAL

Bla 9

Bla 9

0315587030